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THE LAW OF UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES:
THE NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT RECOGNIZES THE
RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL FOR NONCRIMINAL TRAFFIC
OFFENSES IN RIEMERS V. ESLINGER
PETER WELTE*

ABSTRACT
The right to a jury trial is one of the most important of constitutional
rights. Practically speaking, exercising that right consumes both the time
and resources of citizens and the judicial system. It is well-established that
an accused is not entitled to a jury trial when charged with a petty offense.
Permitting a jury trial in petty offenses would bottleneck an already burdened court calendar, and the cost-benefit relationship of a jury trial in petty
offenses is untenable. Accordingly, there are multiple offenses for which
an accused is entitled to a hearing in front of a judicial officer, but not a
hearing rising to the level of a jury trial. For example, a citizen accused of
violating highway speed limits is entitled to an administrative hearing for
that violation, but is not entitled to a jury trial. The right to a jury trial,
therefore, involves a delicate balance between the nature of the right and the
level of the offense. A recent North Dakota Supreme Court decision
directly affects that delicate balance. This essay examines that decision.
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“The law embodies the story of a nation’s development
through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained
only the axioms and corollaries of a book of mathematics.”
— Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

I am a prosecutor and thus am a courtroom lawyer.2 Courtroom lawyers are keenly aware of the law of unintended consequences.3 We learn
that the full impact of a court’s decision is rarely known immediately after
the decision is made. Although a court’s decision may have an immediate
consequence—an intended consequence—upon each litigant, the decision’s
full consequence—both intended and unintended—is only known after the
court’s decision is tested and tried over a period of time by other courts.
Surely all judges are well aware their decisions carry both intended and
unintended consequences. In fact, members of the North Dakota Supreme
Court have explicitly acknowledged the concept at least four times in the
past twenty years.4 In each of those four cases is an acknowledgement of
the idea that unintended consequences are not desirable in the context of
judicial economy and practicality because unintended consequences inject

*Grand Forks County State’s Attorney, Grand Forks, North Dakota. Adjunct Instructor of
Law, University of North Dakota School of Law. The author is a 1997 graduate, with distinction,
of the University of North Dakota School of Law and has been the elected States Attorney for
Grand Forks County, North Dakota, since 2002. He thanks the editors and staff of the North
Dakota Law Review, specifically Ben Williams, the Outside Articles Editor, who has been as
patient and helpful to the author as any editor could possibly be. This essay consists of the analysis of only the author, who is solely responsible for any errors or omissions.
1. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881).
2. Prosecutors, defense attorneys, civil litigators, magistrates, and judges are members of a
group of lawyers who witness the functioning of a courtroom each workday. For purposes of this
essay, these lawyers are called courtroom lawyers.
3. According to wordiq.com, “The Law of unintended consequences holds that almost all human actions have at least one unintended consequence.” Unintended Consequence, WORDIQ.COM,
http://www.wordiq.com/definition/Unintended_consequence (last visited Mar. 18, 2011). “In
other words, each cause has more than one effect including unforeseen effects. The idea was originated by sociologist Robert K. Merton.” Id.
4. Forum Commc’ns Co. v. Paulson, 2008 ND 140, ¶ 32, 752 N.W.2d 177, 187
(VandeWalle, C.J., concurring) (“I write to note that our opinion may have unintended
consequences.”); State v. Salveson, 2006 ND 169, ¶ 28, 719 N.W.2d 747, 757 (Maring, J., dissenting) (“[T]he fact that an unintended consequence occurred does not support a finding that the
defendant had two substantially different criminal objectives.”); Anderson v. N.D. Workers
Comp. Bureau, 553 N.W.2d 496, 500 (N.D. 1996) (Neumann, J., concurring) (“Without adequate
presentation to aid my ponderous thought processes, I fear the possibility of unintended
consequences.”); Lapp v. Reeder Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 3, 491 N.W.2d 65, 71 (N.D. 1992) (Levine,
J., concurring) (“While our interpretation of these statutes may create law of unintended
consequences, the legislature can overcome our mistaken view by amending the statutes to effect
its intended consequences.”).
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uncertainty into a court’s decision.5 Uncertainty fosters misunderstanding;
misunderstanding fosters litigation. Thus, unintended consequences can
cause unnecessary litigation, which consumes a court’s limited time and
resources.
On May 11, 2010, the North Dakota Supreme Court issued a decision
that illustrates the law of unintended consequences both for practicing attorneys and for taxpayers in the State of North Dakota. In Riemers v.
Eslinger,6 the court held the appellant, Roland Riemers, had a constitutional
right to a jury trial for an alleged violation of a noncriminal municipal traffic ordinance punishable by a twenty dollar fine.7 In short, the court held
Riemers had a constitutional right to a jury trial for a petty offense. This
essay discusses the peculiar manner in which the Riemers case came before
the North Dakota Supreme Court, the majority decision in the case, and the
dissent. Finally, there is a brief discussion of the possible consequences—
intended or unintended—of the decision in Riemers.
II. BACKGROUND
A. FACTS
On July 22, 2009, Riemers was charged with following too closely to
another vehicle, in violation of the Grand Forks City Code.8 For the
offense, Riemers was subject to a twenty dollar fine.9 Because the offense
was a noncriminal traffic offense, there was no possibility of incarceration.10 He pled not guilty to the offense in municipal court and requested a
transfer to district court under North Dakota Century Code section 40-1815.1.11 The municipal judge, Henry Eslinger, denied the request, and
Riemers responded by requesting a supervisory writ from the North Dakota
Supreme Court.12 The court granted the petition with regard to whether
Riemers had a constitutional right to a jury trial for a noncriminal municipal
traffic citation punishable by a twenty dollar fine.13

5. See cases cited supra note 4.
6. 2010 ND 76, 781 N.W.2d 632.
7. Riemers, ¶ 12, 781 N.W.2d at 635-36.
8. Id. ¶ 2, 781 N.W.2d at 633.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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B. PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Riemers took an uncommon path to the North Dakota Supreme Court.
The case came before the court on a supervisory writ, petitioned for by
Riemers.14 The court has discretionary authority to issue a supervisory writ,
and a party to a case does not have a right to such a writ.15 Historically, the
court has exercised its authority to issue supervisory writs rarely and
cautiously and only to rectify errors and prevent injustice in extraordinary
cases in which there is no adequate alternative remedy.16 Supervisory writs
are considered extraordinary relief.17 The authority exists “so there might
be some method by which the harmonious working of our judicial system
could be insured, and to meet emergencies, and where other relief provided
is inadequate or incomplete.”18
Riemers represented himself.19 A self-represented appellant seeking a
supervisory writ suggests a level of sophistication not often seen in selfrepresented appellants; indeed, Riemers is not the typical self-represented
appellant. He has litigated before the North Dakota Supreme Court twentyfive times in the past twelve years, and before the North Dakota Court of
Appeals four times in that span.20 Of those twenty-nine cases, twenty-eight
21
times he was either pro se or self-represented. Remarkably, as a nonlawyer, he has been before the North Dakota Supreme Court more often
14. Id. ¶ 1.
15. Roe v. Rothe-Seeger, 2000 ND 63, ¶ 5, 608 N.W.2d 289, 291.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. State ex rel. Red River Brick Corp. v. Dist. Court, 138 N.W. 988, 989 (N.D. 1912).
19. Riemers v. Eslinger, 2010 ND 76, 781 N.W.2d 632 (syllabus).
20. See generally, e.g., City of Grand Forks v. Riemers, No. 20100107, 2010 WL 5416843
(N.D. Dec. 21, 2010); Riemers v. Eslinger, 2010 ND 76, 781 N.W.2d 632; State ex rel. Dep’t of
Labor v. Riemers, 2010 ND 43, 779 N.W.2d 649; Riemers v. State, 2009 ND 115, 767 N.W.2d
832; State ex rel. Dep’t of Labor v. Riemers, 2008 ND 191, 757 N.W.2d 50; City of Grand Forks
v. Riemers, 2008 ND 153, 755 N.W.2d 99; Riemers v. State, 2008 ND 118, 756 N.W.2d 344;
Riemers v. State, 2008 ND 101, 750 N.W.2d 407; Riemers v. Mahar, 2008 ND 95, 748 N.W.2d
714; Riemers v. State, 2007 ND APP 4, 739 N.W.2d 248; Riemers v. State, 2007 ND APP 3, 738
N.W.2d 906; Riemers v. State, 2007 ND APP 2, 732 N.W.2d 398; Riemers v. State, 2007 ND
APP 1, 731 N.W.2d 620; Riemers v. City of Grand Forks, 2006 ND 224, 723 N.W.2d 518;
Riemers v. State, 2006 ND 162, 718 N.W.2d 566; Riemers v. Grand Forks Herald, 2004 ND 192,
688 N.W.2d 167; Riemers v. Omdahl, 2004 ND 188, 687 N.W.2d 445; Riemers v. PetersRiemers, 2004 ND 153, 684 N.W.2d 619; Riemers v. Anderson, 2004 ND 109, 680 N.W.2d 280;
Riemers v. O’Halloran, 2004 ND 79, 678 N.W.2d 547; Peters-Riemers v. Riemers, 2004 ND 28,
674 N.W.2d 287; Lamb v. Riemers, 2003 ND 148, 669 N.W.2d 113; Peters-Riemers v. Riemers,
2003 ND 96, 663 N.W.2d 657; Flattum-Riemers v. Flattum-Riemers, 2003 ND 70, 660 N.W.2d
558; Peters-Riemers v. Riemers, 2002 ND 72, 644 N.W.2d 197; Peters-Riemers v. Riemers, 2002
ND 49, 641 N.W.2d 83; Flattum-Riemers v. Peters-Riemers, 2001 ND 121, 630 N.W.2d 71;
Peters-Riemers v. Riemers, 2001 ND 62, 623 N.W.2d 83; Flattum-Riemers v. Flattum-Riemers,
1999 ND 146, 598 N.W.2d 499.
21. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. Riemers was represented by counsel in
Peters-Riemers v. Riemers, 2003 ND 96, 663 N.W.2d 657.
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than most practicing North Dakota attorneys during the same time frame.
In fact, in petitioning for the supervisory writ, it appears Riemers was
simply following the direction that had been given to him by the court two
years earlier in a separate, but similar, case.22
In City of Grand Forks v. Riemers,23 Riemers was charged with a
noncriminal traffic offense and appeared in Grand Forks Municipal Court.24
He filed a list of objections, including a demand for a jury trial.25 The jury
trial was denied, the matter was tried to the municipal court bench, and
Riemers was found guilty.26 Riemers then appealed the matter to district
court, requesting a trial de novo and a jury trial.27 The district court denied
his request for a jury trial, and instead the district court bench tried the
matter.28 Riemers was again found guilty.29 He then appealed the matter to
the North Dakota Supreme Court, alleging he had the right to a jury trial in
the underlying offense.30
The North Dakota Supreme Court dismissed Riemers’ appeal, holding
the court had no jurisdiction to hear the matter.31 However, in dismissing
the appeal, Justice Kapsner, who also authored the Riemers v. Eslinger
opinion, wrote:
Although we conclude that we lack jurisdiction over Riemers’
attempted appeal, we note that an appropriate procedure was available for him to challenge the denial of a jury trial. If Riemers believed he had a right to a jury trial on the charged offense, he
should have immediately sought a transfer of the matter from the
municipal court to the district court . . . . If Riemers had filed a
timely request to transfer the matter to district court under
N.D.C.C. § 40-18-15.1, and the municipal court had denied the
transfer or the district court, after transfer, had denied Riemers’
request for a jury trial, Riemers could then have sought a supervisory writ from this Court. This would have been the appropriate
procedure to seek this Court’s review of whether a defendant has a
right to a jury trial in a noncriminal traffic case.32
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See City of Grand Forks v. Riemers, 2008 ND 153, ¶ 8, 755 N.W.2d 99, 101-02.
2008 ND 153, 755 N.W.2d 99.
Riemers, ¶ 2.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3, 755 N.W.2d at 100.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 1.
Id. ¶ 8, 755 N.W.2d at 101-02 (emphasis added).
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Riemers followed the course of action suggested by the court in City of
Grand Forks v. Riemers and found himself before the North Dakota
Supreme Court again in Riemers v. Eslinger.
III. ANALYSIS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The majority opinion in Riemers was authored by Justice Kapsner.33
Chief Justice VandeWalle and Justice Crothers joined in the majority
opinion.34 The majority first explained municipal court jurisdiction and
procedure, and then considered the nature of the right to a jury trial in North
Dakota.35
1.

Explanation of Municipal Court Jurisdiction and Procedure

Early in its opinion, the court explained both the jurisdiction of municipal courts and the procedure for trials in municipal court.36 As far as jurisdiction is concerned, municipal judges have the authority to preside over B
misdemeanors and infractions.37 They also have authority over cases
involving a violation of a city ordinance.38 However, the procedure for
contesting a citation for a violation of a municipal ordinance depends upon
the nature of the citation.39
Procedurally, if the right to a jury trial does not otherwise exist, the
municipal judge may try municipal ordinance citations without a jury.40
However, there are both noncriminal municipal ordinances, and there are
criminal municipal ordinances.41 If the violation is of a criminal ordinance,
then the right to a jury trial exists, and the defendant enforces that right by
making a written request to transfer the case from municipal court to district
court.42
If the defendant in the municipal court proceeding has the right to a
jury trial and does not waive that right, then the jury trial is conducted by
33. Riemers v. Eslinger, 2010 ND 76, ¶ 1, 781 N.W.2d 632, 632.
34. Id. ¶ 28, 781 N.W.2d at 641.
35. Id. ¶¶ 4, 8, 781 N.W.2d at 633-34.
36. Id. ¶ 4, 781 N.W.2d at 633.
37. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-01-15(2) (2006) (conferring authority upon municipal judges
to “[h]ear, try and determine misdemeanors and infractions when jurisdiction has been conferred
by the Constitution of North Dakota and this and other laws”).
38. Riemers, ¶ 4, 781 N.W.2d at 633.
39. Id.
40. Id. ¶ 5.
41. Id.
42. Id. (noting the 1973 legislature eliminated the ability of municipal courts to conduct jury
trials).
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the district court.43 Additionally, should the defendant appeal the decision
of the district court, the appeal of that decision is to the North Dakota
Supreme Court.44 Conversely, if the defendant is willing to waive the right
to a jury trial, then the municipal judge may try the case without a jury—in
other words, a “bench trial.”45 If there is a bench trial in municipal court,
the defendant has the right to appeal the decision of the municipal judge.46
The appeal is made directly to the district court “for trial anew,” pursuant to
North Dakota Century Code section 40-18-19.47 However, a waiver of the
right to a jury trial in municipal court also constitutes a waiver in district
court.48 Accordingly, if the defendant has waived his or her right to a jury
trial, then the “trial anew” in the appeal is a bench trial to the district
judge.49
By North Dakota statute, a defendant has the right to a jury trial in all
criminal prosecutions.50 However, virtually all traffic offenses are deemed
“noncriminal.”51 Therefore, although all defendants charged with a noncriminal traffic offense have the right to a hearing on the offense, that
hearing is limited to a hearing in front of the municipal judge, without the
right to the presence of a jury.52 The appeal of the decision would be to the
district court, again without the right to the presence of a jury.53 Such was
the case with the original violation in Riemers.54
2.

The Nature of the Right to a Jury Trial

The Riemers court acknowledged the import of the case before it,
stating, “The brief and relatively simple history of this case masks the significant questions it raises regarding the right of trial by jury in our state,
which we long ago described as ‘the most important of constitutional
rights.’”55 Emphasizing the nature of the right to a jury trial, the court drew
attention to the precept that, constitutionally, the right to a jury trial is to be
secured to all and to “remain inviolate.”56 The court further emphasized
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-28-03 (2009).
Id. § 40-18-15.
Riemers, ¶ 5, 781 N.W.2d at 633-34.
Id.
Id.
Id.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-01-06(5).
Id. § 39-06.1-02.
Riemers, ¶ 7, 781 N.W.2d at 634.
Id.
Id.
Id. ¶ 3, 781 N.W.2d at 633.
Id. ¶ 8, 781 N.W.2d at 634.
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that none of the substantial elements of the right to a jury trial may be
eliminated by legislation or judicial construction.57
The court took particular care in the manner in which it framed the
issue in Riemers. It noted:
“[T]he framers of the Constitution intended by the adoption of said
provision to preserve and perpetuate the right of trial by jury as it
existed by law at and prior to the adoption of the Constitution.” . . .
As a result, “the right of trial by jury which is secured by the
Constitution is the right of trial by jury with which the people who
adopted it were familiar . . . as defined by the statutes which
existed prior to and at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.” . . . . Therefore, in interpreting the application of art. I, § 13
to violations of municipal ordinances, we examine the right of trial
by jury as of 1889, the year our state adopted its constitution.58
Central to the analysis of both the majority and the dissent in Riemers was
section 937 from the Compiled Laws of the Territory of Dakota (C.L.
§ 937).59 The statute was last modified in 1887, two years before the
Territory of Dakota was separated into the States of North Dakota and
South Dakota.60 However, because the Riemers court was attempting to
apply the right to a jury trial, “which existed prior to and at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution,” the statute became a central focus of the
opinion rendered by the court.61
C.L. § 937 provided the right of trial by jury in specific situations:
Cases before the city justice arising under the city ordinances shall
be tried and determined by the justice without the intervention of a
jury except in cases where under the provisions of the ordinances
of the city imprisonment for a longer period than ten days is made
a part of the penalty, or the maximum fine shall be twenty dollars
or over, and the defendant shall demand a trial by jury before the
commencement of such trial . . . .62
Because Riemers was facing a twenty dollar fine and the right to a jury trial
existed in 1889 for alleged violations involving a punishment of ten or more

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id.
Id. ¶¶ 8-9, 781 N.W.2d at 634-35 (citations omitted).
Id. ¶¶ 10, 31, 781 N.W.2d at 635, 642.
Id. ¶ 10, 781 N.W.2d at 635.
Id. ¶ 9, 781 N.W.2d at 634.
C.L. § 937 (1887).
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days in jail or a twenty dollar fine, the majority held Riemers was entitled to
a jury trial under the Constitution of the State of North Dakota.63
The analysis of the majority focused upon the nature of the right to a
jury trial.64 Acknowledging the Territorial Legislature replaced city justices
with police justices seven months before the adoption of the state constitution,65 the majority noted the Territorial Legislature did not alter the right of
trial by jury itself, but rather just the official to whom the case would be
tried.66 Additionally, the right to appeal the adverse decision at the time
remained with the district court, similar to the right of appeal under present
North Dakota law.67 To the majority, this analysis was consistent with the
desire of the framers that the nature of the right to a jury trial shall remain
inviolate.68
The City of Grand Forks argued Riemers was analogous to State v.
Brown,69 a recent North Dakota case addressing the right to a jury trial for a
defendant charged with violating a Cass County animal control ordinance.70
In Brown, the defendant was cited for violating an ordinance authorizing no
possible imprisonment and fined fifty dollars.71 Brown argued the North
Dakota Constitution afforded her the right to a trial by jury because the
right to a jury trial applied to violations of ordinances authorizing a fine of
twenty dollars or more.72
The majority in Brown held the defendant did not have the right to a
jury trial because the violation of the ordinance was a criminal infraction,
an offense not recognized at the time the state constitution was adopted.73
The Brown court stated the legislature meant for infractions to be “an
entirely new category of lesser criminal offenses with its own unique procedural requirements.”74 Accordingly, in Brown, the North Dakota Supreme
Court held “a person charged with violating an infraction-level offense,
including a county ordinance creating an infraction-level offense, which
carries no possibility of imprisonment, is not entitled to a jury trial under
N.D. Const. art. I, § 13.”75
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Riemers, ¶ 12, 781 N.W.2d at 635.
Id.
Id. ¶ 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
2009 ND 150, 771 N.W.2d 267.
Brown, ¶ 44, 771 N.W.2d at 279.
Id. ¶ 46, 771 N.W.2d at 280.
Id.
Id. ¶¶ 49-50, 771 N.W.2d at 281.
Id. ¶ 50.
Id. ¶ 52, 771 N.W.2d at 282.
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The City of Grand Forks attempted to analogize Riemers to Brown. As
in Brown, where infractions were developed after the adoption of the
Constitution, the City argued that territorial law similarly did not comprehensively regulate traffic prior to the adoption of the state Constitution.76
This would seem to be a reasonable argument, given the automobile had not
yet taken the nation by storm in 1889, the year of North Dakota’s statehood;
however, the court was unpersuaded.77
In disposing of the City’s argument that Riemers was analogous to
Brown, the majority opined “the City misstates the nature of traffic regulations at the time the state constitution was adopted.”78 The Compiled Laws
of 1887, in fact, gave cities the authority to regulate traffic upon the streets
and to regulate the speed of horses and other animals and vehicles within
city limits.79 The court indicated the City of Grand Forks had adopted
traffic ordinances as early as 1887 and had even authorized fines of five to
twenty-five dollars for violations.80 The court declined to apply the reasoning of Brown to Riemers, in part because as early as 1887, the City had
the right to regulate traffic in the streets, and at that time, the fines imposed
for violating traffic ordinances were high enough to trigger the right to a
jury trial under territorial law.81
The majority also disposed of another argument posited by the City of
Grand Forks that is crucial to delineating the nature of the right to a jury
trial. It is well-established the right to trial by jury under the United States
Constitution does not apply to “petty” offenses.82 In determining whether
an offense is petty or serious, courts focus on the maximum prison term
authorized for committing the offense.83 According to the United States
Supreme Court, if a prison term of less than six months is attached to an
offense, courts presume the offense to be petty.84 The offense with which
Riemers was charged was punishable by a twenty dollar fine and no
incarceration.85

76. Riemers v. Eslinger, 2010 ND 76, ¶ 13, 781 N.W.2d 632, 636.
77. Id. ¶ 16, 781 N.W.2d at 637.
78. Id. ¶ 14.
79. Id.
80. Id. ¶ 15 (describing an 1887 Grand Forks city ordinance that prohibited persons from
driving “any wagon, carriage, dray, cart, or other vehicle” at a speed greater than six miles an
hour).
81. Id. ¶ 16.
82. Id. ¶ 17, 781 N.W.2d at 637-38.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. ¶ 18, 781 N.W.2d at 638.
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The majority acknowledged Riemers was faced with a petty offense.86
However, the court stated its decision would not be affected by this fact
because “we may provide the citizens of our state, as a matter of state
constitutional law, greater protection than the safeguards guaranteed in the
Federal Constitution.”87 The court gave no rationale, nor was it required to,
for affording this greater protection to the citizens of North Dakota.88
In concluding its opinion, the Riemers majority distinguished its
analysis from the treatment given to the same issue by the South Dakota
Supreme Court.89 The majority noted both North Dakota and South Dakota
were admitted into the United States on November 2, 1889, and that both
states were governed at that time by the Compiled Laws of the Territory of
Dakota.90 The court noted the right to a jury trial in both states “should
theoretically be the same.”91 In fact, when faced with the same issue as the
Riemers court, the South Dakota Supreme Court initially held its Constitution preserved the right to a jury trial in cases like Riemers.92 The Riemers
court noted, however, that South Dakota’s initial interpretation of this right
was only temporary.93
In State v. Wikle,94 the South Dakota Supreme Court overruled its
earlier decision in City of Brookings v. Roberts,95 holding there was no
constitutional right in South Dakota to a jury trial for violations of municipal ordinances where the ordinance authorized imprisonment for ten or
more days or a fine of twenty or more dollars.96 The Wikle court focused
upon the concurring opinions in Roberts as accurately describing the constitutional right to a jury trial in South Dakota.97 Citing the concurrence’s
requirement of a possible jail sentence as one line of demarcation in determining the right to a jury trial, the Wikle court also noted it “could not give
[a] literal endorsement to an 1887 law that referred to $20 as the demarcation line for jury trials.”98 The Wikle court stated, “The rule of law that
incorporated existing statutory law into our state constitution upon its
86. Id. (“Therefore, the City is likely correct that Riemers does not have a right to a jury trial
under the U.S. Constitution because following too closely is a petty offense.”).
87. Id. (citing Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975)).
88. Id.
89. Id. ¶ 23, 781 N.W.2d at 639-40.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. ¶¶ 23-24 (citing City of Brookings v. Roberts, 226 N.W.2d 380, 381 (S.D. 1975)).
93. Id. ¶ 24, 781 N.W.2d at 640.
94. 291 N.W.2d 792 (S.D. 1980).
95. 226 N.W.2d 380 (S.D. 1975).
96. Wikle, 291 N.W.2d at 794-95.
97. Id. at 793.
98. Id. at 794.
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adoption should be followed in matters of legal principle, but it becomes
absurd when followed literally in regard to monetary amounts.”99
The Riemers majority, however, was “unpersuaded” by the reasoning
of the South Dakota Supreme Court in Wikle.100 Maintaining the South
Dakota Supreme Court did not analyze the nature of the right under territorial law in 1889, the Riemers court was also troubled with which principle
to apply to the twenty dollar limit.101 If not the literal twenty dollar limit,
asked the court, then what principle should apply if the value of the dollar
varies?102 The court asked how it should determine the right to a jury trial
if the right were to fluctuate with inflation. The majority closed its opinion:
We hold to our prior jurisprudence, that the right of trial by jury is
determined by the laws as they existed at the time the Constitution
of North Dakota was adopted, and decline to follow the South
Dakota Supreme Court. The people of North Dakota may change
this right if they choose.103
B. THE DISSENT
Justice Sandstrom wrote the dissenting opinion in Riemers, joined by
Justice Maring.104 The dissent began with the acknowledgment that the
Constitution of North Dakota preserves the right to a jury trial in cases for
which the right existed at statehood.105 Citing C.L. § 937, the same territorial statute relied upon by the majority, but with a different analysis of what
constitutes a petty offense, Justice Sandstrom opined:
At statehood, the law of Dakota Territory, which became the law
of North Dakota, provided for a jury trial for serious, “non-petty,”
violations of municipal ordinances. On the basis of this interpretation, which is consistent with the interpretation of the United
States Supreme Court and other courts as discussed below,
Riemers is not entitled to a jury trial.106
Calling the majority’s interpretation “unreasonable and inconsistent,”107 Justice Sandstrom took issue with the majority’s analysis of and

99. Id.
100. Riemers v. Eslinger, 2010 ND 76, ¶ 26, 781 N.W.2d 632, 641.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. ¶ 29, 781 N.W.2d at 641 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).
105. Id. ¶ 30.
106. Id.
107. Id. ¶ 29.
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reliance upon C.L. § 937.108 His inference was that there are two ways to
analyze C.L. § 937.109 It can be analyzed in a literal sense, or it can be
analyzed using modern equivalents.110
On one hand, a literal reading of C.L. § 937 provides for a bench trial
unless the “maximum fine shall be twenty dollars or over.”111 The majority
relied upon a literal interpretation of this language in justifying its holding
that the Constitution of North Dakota provided Riemers with the right to a
jury trial for a noncriminal municipal traffic citation punishable by a twenty
dollar fine.112 But, Justice Sandstrom noted a consistent literal reading of
the statute applies only to “cases before the city justice.”113 Accordingly,
because the office of city justice had been legislatively abolished, Justice
Sandstrom pointed out a literal interpretation of the entire statute—and not
just one segment of the statute—would result in a logical conclusion that
Riemers did not have a constitutional right to a jury trial because city
justices no longer exist under North Dakota law.114
Justice Sandstrom illustrated a consistent “modern equivalent” analysis
of C.L. § 937 would also result in determining Riemers did not have the
constitutional right to a jury trial.115 Assuming the modern equivalent of a
city justice would be a municipal judge, Justice Sandstrom noted the modern equivalent of twenty dollars in 1887 would be approximately four hundred dollars.116 Thus, consistently analyzing C.L. § 937 as a whole using
modern equivalents would result in Riemers not having the right to a jury
trial. Justice Sandstrom then followed his analysis to its logical conclusion
in illustrating the inconsistent logic used by the majority in analyzing C.L.
§ 937: “Only by applying one rule (modern equivalent) to the first half of
the sentence and the other rule (literal language) to the second half of the
sentence does the majority reach its conclusion.”117
Justice Sandstrom also illustrated how the majority’s analysis in
Riemers was inconsistent with the jurisprudence of the United States
Supreme Court regarding the right to a jury trial.118 In a line of cases
extending over 120 years, the United States Supreme Court has held the
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
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118.

Id. ¶ 31, 781 N.W.2d at 642.
Id. ¶¶ 31-32.
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Id. ¶ 31 (emphasis omitted).
Id. ¶ 27, 781 N.W.2d at 641.
Id. ¶ 32, 781 N.W.2d at 642.
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Id. ¶¶ 33-34.
Id. ¶¶ 35-36.
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right to a jury trial in criminal prosecutions applies only to serious crimes,
not petty offenses.119 Furthermore, although the United States “Supreme
Court has declined to establish a precise line of demarcation for petty
offenses,” it has indicated a crime is not petty when there is a possibility of
incarceration for six months or more.120 Given the fact that Riemers faced a
penalty of twenty dollars with no possibility of any incarceration, it would
have been well within the parameters of United States Supreme Court
jurisprudence to hold Riemers’ offense was petty and thus carried with it no
right to a jury trial.
Justice Sandstrom further elaborated on the analysis of the South
Dakota Supreme Court in both Roberts and Wikle.121 Reiterating the
court’s statements in Roberts that it “could not give literal endorsement to
an 1887 law that referred to $20 as the demarcation line for jury trials,”
Justice Sandstrom also noted the South Dakota Supreme Court has since
extended its opinion in Wikle.122 Specifically, in State v. Auen,123 the South
Dakota Supreme Court held in prosecutions of offenses with maximum
authorized jail sentences of less than six months, a court may deny a jury
trial request if the court assures the defendant that no jail sentence will be
imposed.124
IV. CONCLUSION: WHERE DOES NORTH DAKOTA GO
FROM HERE?
From a courtroom lawyer’s perspective, and from a taxpayer’s perspective, it is difficult to accept that the law of North Dakota now provides
for a jury trial in cases involving no possibility of jail and a fine of twenty
dollars. In February 2011, six jurors made history as the first North Dakota
jurors to hear a parking ticket case.125 Not all the jurors felt the time was
well spent; “I think public servants and citizens have a lot better use of time
than to be giving consideration over what I understood to be a $20 ticket,”
said jury foreman Mark Jones.126 Ironically—or perhaps not—the defendant in the case was none other than Roland Riemers.127 The court administrator estimated the cost of the jury alone to be approximately $780, not
119. Id. ¶ 36.
120. Id.
121. Id. ¶¶ 37-38, 781 N.W.2d at 642-43.
122. Id. ¶¶ 39-40, 781 N.W.2d at 643.
123. 342 N.W.2d 236 (S.D. 1984).
124. Id. at 238.
125. Archie Ingersoll, Parking Ticket Case Heard by Grand Forks Jurors, GRAND FORKS
HERALD, Feb. 9, 2011, at B1.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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counting the time invested by the judge, court clerk, and court reporter.
Even without any possible appeal, it is difficult to rationalize—at least in a
purely economic sense—the cost of collecting the twenty dollar fine in such
a case. That cost would, inarguably, be dramatically reduced if the right to
a jury trial did not attach to such an offense.
Should the North Dakota Supreme Court not overrule Riemers in a
future case, the court indicated the people of North Dakota could change
this newfound right if they should so choose.128 The court was likely
referring to a constitutional measure clarifying the right to a jury trial in the
State of North Dakota. Another option would be legislative action, although there is none of any kind pending during the current legislative
session. Regardless, the right to a jury trial for a petty offense is the law of
the land in North Dakota. It remains to be seen what additional consequences—intended or unintended—accompany that right.

128. Riemers v. Eslinger, 2010 ND 76, ¶ 26, 781 N.W.2d 632, 641.

